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Abstract
Applied general equilibrium modeling has become a widely used tool in
analyzing the effects of changes in tax and trade policies of developed and
developing countries.

Some of these models introduce non-competitive market

structures into the analysis to capture market imperfections in real economies.
However,

in these applications the difficulties encountered by theorists for

extending general equilibrium analysis to economies with monopolistic competition
and oligopoly have been ignored.

In particular, some of the applications (which

depart from the large-group-free-entry-zero-profit variant of the Chamberlinian
monopolistic competition are especially vulnerable to the critique that the
results can be very sensitive to the arbitrary choice of price normalization.
We illustrate how price normalization matters in a model representative of those
used in the trade literature with oligopoly imply that the effects of policy
changes on welfare and resource allocation are sensitive to the choice of
numeraire in these models.

KEY WORDS: Applied General Equilibrium Modeling, Monopolistic Competition, Price
Normalization
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I.

Introductio n

Since the late 1970's, the most active area for publication in
internation al economics has been the application of models of imperfectly
competitive industries from the industrial organization literature to
internation al trade theory and policy.

Application s to positive economics

emphasize the ability of increasing returns to scale with the associated
imperfectly competitive producer behavior to explain intra-indus try
internation al trade.

For normative economics, some of these models

provided a rationale for active government intervention to promote national
firms in oligopolist ic internation al markets under certain conditions.
Recently, these models have been applied to the quantitative analysis of
trade policy changes in computable general equilibrium versions.
For some time, general equilibrium theorists have recognized major
difficultie s introducing oligopoly and monopolisti c competition into
general equilibrium analysis.

Although these problems are well-known among

theoreticia ns, their implication s for the theoretical and quantitativ e
analysis of internation al trade policies under imperfect competition has
not been acknowledge d in the trade literature.

The purpose of this paper

is to point out the potential importance of these pitfalls for the analysis
of trade with imperfect competition .
Difficultie s that arise for the theory of monopolisti c competition and
oligopoly in general equilibrium originate in the optimization problem for
non-price-t aking firms.

When a monopolisti c or oligopolist ic firm takes

account of the income effect generated by its profit on the demand for its
output, convexity can fail for both the choice set and the objective
function for the profit-maxim izing firm, and existence of equilibrium

2

cannot be proved in general.

The possibility of non-existence of an

equilibrium in which some firms behave in Cournot fashion and other agents
act as price-takers (defined as a Cournot-Walras equilibrium by Gabszewicz
and Vial [1972)) has been shown in examples by Dierker and Grodal [1986]
and proven to be a generic property by Bohm (1990].
It is also known that the set of equilibria is sensitive to the manner
in which relative prices are normalized.

That is, the equilibrium

allocation and vector of relative prices change with the price
normalization, and equilibrium may fail to exist for some choices of
normalization and not for others.

This is a consequence of the assumption

that firms maximize profits and take account of the effect their decisions
have on market prices.

Typical partial equilibrium models of oligopoly set

the nominal wage equal to one, implicitly assuming that labor serves as the
numSraire.

The firm then maximizes the purchasing power of profits in

units of labor.

If the firm's product is chosen as numeraire, then the

oligopolist would maximize the purchasing power of profits in terms of that
good.

Changing the numeraire has no effect on Walrasian equilibria since

the objective function for profit-maximizing firms is unaffected if all
prices are taken as given.

Changing price normalization typically leads

price-setting firms to choose different production plans.
Two types of models have gained popularity in the literature on
international trade under imperfect competition.

Models of one type are

general equilibrium versions of the Chamberlin model of monopolistic
competition for a large group of firms with free entry.

Krugman [1979,

1980, 1981), Dixit and Norman (1980], Ethier [1979] and several others
adopt the specific general equilibrium model of Chamberlinian monopolistic
competition of Dixit and Stiglitz [1977], while Helpman [1981] and
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Lancaster (1980] use a variant based on Lancastrian model of demand for
product characteristics.

Models of the other type are based on partial

equilibrium models of oligopoly.

The simple duopoly model presented in the

critical analysis by Eaton and Grossman [1986] represents this literature
well.
We show how the choice of price normalization affects equilibrium
relative prices and allocations in a simple general equilibrium model in
the spirit of the Dixit-Stiglitz and Eaton-Grossman models.

Production

technologies display constant returns to scale in one case and increasing
returns to scale in the other.
households act as price-takers.

Firms behave as Cournot oligopolists while
We argue that the dependence of equilibria

on numeraire choice is an important problem for models of international
trade under imperfect competition.
Once it is established that equilibria are sensitive to the
specification of the numeraire, it is clear that estimates of the effects
on welfare and resource allocation of changes in indirect or direct tax
rates, tariff rates or quantitative restraints on international or national
trade from computable general equilibrium models incorporating imperfect
competition should be treated with caution.

Because imperfect competition

is included in these models, policy reforms take place in a second-best
world.

Since trade liberalization or reduction of a distortionary tax, in

general, has an ambiguous effect on welfare in all second-best
environments, simulation using a computable model based on estimated
equations is a useful tool for resolving the ambiguity and assessing the
impact of trade and fiscal reforms under such market structures.

1

The

analyses of trade reforms using computable general equilibrium with
monopolistically competitive or olipolistic industries by Harris [1984a,b],
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Cox and Harris [1985], de Melo and Roland-Holst [1990a,b] and Devarajan and
Rodrik [1989a,b], among others, are all subject to the criticism that the
results could be sensitive to the arbitrary choice of price normalization
made. 2

Changing the numeraire in a computable general equilibrium version

can affect the size and even sign of the effects of policy changes on
welfare and allocation of factors across industries.

II.

Profit Maximization and Numeraire Choice

Consider an economy in which there are at least two price-setting
firms.

There are n goods and a single price-taking representative

household.

The production function for each produced good is continuously

differentiable and is given by f.{x, x ,
2
J
1

••• , x

{not normalized) prices is denoted by (p , p ,

1

n

).

• • • I

2

The vector of absolute
p ).

n

The profit for a

price-setting firm producing good j in absolute prices is given by

II . = p, fj{x ,
1
J

J

... ,

X

n

)

-

n

h p, x.
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l.

i=l
,.
If good 1 is chosen as the numeraire, the firm's profit function is
given by

7f •

J

f.{x ,
1
J

... , x ) n

X,
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Alternatively, if good n is taken to be the numeraire, the firm's profit
function becomes

n
f.{x ,
1
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h

p,
l.

x.

l.
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so that

Hence, if p /p
1

n

is taken as given by the firm, then maximization of~-

J

and :rj would be equivalent.

If p /pn is not taken as given, then the
1

first-order conditions for profit maximization by firm j under these two
choices of numeraire are related by the equation

{) :r.
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J
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~
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+

J
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J

ax.J

, for each j = 1, ... , n,

is firm j's conjecture of the effect of an increase in firm

j's output on the relative price, p /pn.
1

=
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:r.
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=
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J
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J
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and only if

~J-< 0 .
j

This implies that the necessary conditions for profit maximization by firm
j are identical under these two choices of relative price normalization
only if the profit expressed in terms of either numeraire is zero in the
particular equilibrium.
In general, the objective function and supply correspondence for a
profit-maximizing oligopolist depend upon the normalization chosen for
relative prices.

Whenever the profit of some non-price-taking firm is not

zero in equilibrium, changing the numeraire changes equilibrium relative
prices and allocations.

If the profits of all firms are zero in a
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particular equilibrium for one choice of normalization for relative prices,
then that equilibrium will survive a change in the method of normalizing
prices.
Below we assume that the firm recognizes the income effect of its own
profit on demand, and we restrict our attention to Cournot conjectures for
simplicity.

In the literature on monopolistic competition and oligopoly in

general equilibrium, this is called the objective demand approach (see Hart
(1985]).

Under Cournot conjectures, each firm includes the effect of its

output level on profit income in its calculation of the effect of its
decision on demand.

III.

Some examples

A simple example economy is used to demonstrate the importance of

numeraire choice for models of international trade and policy under
monopolistic competition and oligopoly.

This model is a simple general

equilibrium version of that used by Eaton and Grossman [1986] to show the
dependence of optimal national policies on the conjectures assumed to be
held by firms.

It also is recognizably close to the Dixit-Stiglitz model

for a small group of firms.
There are three commodities and two firms.
representative household.

There is a single

For the sake of simplicity, we do not identify

countries and discuss international trade explicitly.

It is

straightforward to envision that one firm operates in each country and that
households have identical tastes across the border.
The endowment of the representative household consists of a supply of
only one commodity, leisure, denoted z.

Production of each of the other
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two goods, x and y, requires an input of labor.
to produce one unit of good xis a

P2 ·y .

unit of goody is a2 +
leisure equal to unity.

1

+

P1 ·x,

The amount of labor needed

and the labor requirement per

The household has an initial endowment of

The preferences for the household display constant

elasticity of substitution and are represented by the utility function:
U = x

0

+ y

0

+ z

0

, for O <

0

< 1.

The household behaves as a perfect competitor choosing how much of
goods x and y to purchase and how much labor to supply.

Each of the two

firms behaves as a Cournot duopolist, taking into account how its
production decision affects equilibrium prices under the assumption that
the other firm's output is fixed.

That is, the firm does not take the wage

rate, as well as the price of its output, as given.
Maximization of utility subject to the household's budget yields the
following set of first-order conditions:
z

( 1)

(-)

( 2)

(-)

1-B

X

z
y

P1

=

(--)

=

(--)

w

1-B

P2

w

=

(3)

where p , p and ware the absolute prices of goods x, y and z,
1
2
respectively.

Il

1

and Il

2

are the profits in terms of absolute prices for

firm 1 and firm 2, respectively.
If leisure is chosen as the num~raire, then the profits for the two
firms are given by:
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z
(-;-)

1-0 ·x

-

(a

+

1

/3
1

x), and

Note that the inverse demand function for good xis

--------X -------- )

1-0

The first-order conditions for

profit maximization under the Cournot assumption subject to the equilibrium
condition are

81tl

(4)

Ox

81t2
( 5)

Oy

where q

1

-

=

0

q

-

/3 1

(1 -

0/(0-1)
0) ql

- /3 1 <

0

q2 -

/32

(1 -

0/(0-1)
0) q2

- /3 2

1

Q

I

are the relative prices of goods x and yin

w

w

<

0, and

terms of leisure, respectively.
If good xis chosen as the numeraire, then the profit for each firm is
given by:

X

-

X

( -- )
2

1-0

(a

1

+

/3
1

x)

,

and

The first-order condition for a solution to firm l's profit-maximiza tion
problem is
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( 4,)

1/(0-1)]
- /J ·q -1
[ 1 + {J 1 ·q 1
1 1

<

0.

The first-order condition for a solution for firm 2 is

[8

( 5, )

q2 -

/J 2

(1 -

0)

°2

(-z- +

/J 2 • q21/(0-1) )

-

/J 2 J <

0.

A Cournot-Walras equilibrium when leisure is the numeraire is found by
solving inequalities 1, 2, 4, 5 and

( 6)

When good xis chosen to be the numeraire, then the general equilibrium
relative prices and allocation solve inequalities 1, 2, 4', 5' and 6.
Clearly, these two sets of necessary conditions differ in general.

As

noted by Dierker and Grodal [1986] and Hart [1985], Cournot-Walras
equilibria may not exist for some price normalization rules.
We give the following numerical example to illustrate that the sets of
equilibria can differ when neither is non-empty.
Example 1:
Let a

1

=

a

2

=

0 and {J

1

= {J

2

=

1/3, and let

0=

0.5.

chosen to be the numeraire, there is a single equilibrium.
1,
X

=

y

=

Z

and

=

3/5

This allocation yields utility,

0.6.

When leisure is
This is
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3 (3/5)

U

0 5
·

~

2.3228.

If good xis chosen as the numeraire, then the solution to the
first-order conditions that satisfies the second-orde r conditions for
profit-maxi mization of the Cournot-duo polists is

=

0.6369,

q2

=

0.8285,

X

=

1.0684,

y

=

0.6314, and

z

=

0.4334.

q

1

This allocation yields utility,

=

U

2.4866.

The unique Pareto optimum (the Walrasian equilibrium allocation) is given by

=

X

=

y

z

=

1/7.

9/7,

This allocation gives the household utility,

=

U

1°•

5

N

2.6458.

Example 2:
As a second example, we allow fixed costs to be positive.
rest of the example the same, let

a

1

=

a

2

= 0.2.

Keeping the

The solution for the

unique Cournot-Wa lras equilibrium when leisure is the numeraire is
q

q

1

=

X

y

2

=

1, and

=

Z

=

9/25

=

0.36.

Utility for the household is equal to
1.8.

U

When good xis chosen to be the numeraire, the equilibrium is
q

1

q2

0.9050,

0.9779,
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X

0.4173,

y

0.3574, and

z

=

0.3418.

The equilibrium level of utility for the household and profits for each
firm are given by
U

=

1.8284,

~l

=

0.3450, and

~2

=

0.0336.

The unique Pareto optimal (and Walrasian equilibrium) allocation is

z

= 27/35,

y

X

=

and

3/35,

resulting in a level of utility of U

=

2.0494.

In these examples, we can allow free entry and exit of firms in the
manner of Dixit and Stiglitz [1977].

u

= z0

n
+

~

i=l

0

X.
l.

The utility function is given by

,

where n, the number of product types, is determined by free entry.

Firms

enter until the addition of one more firm results in negative equilibrium
profits for that firm.

Applications of models of monopolistic competition

to international trade assume that the profits of every firm are zero in
condition of equilibrium (for example, Krugman [1979, 1980 and 1981],
Helpman [1981] and Helpman and Krugman [1985)).

When zero profits for all

firms is imposed as a condition of equilibrium, the particular price
normalization rule chosen has no effect on any firm's decision problem so
that the set of equilibrium relative prices and allocations are the same
for all such rules.

However, free entry is not the same as assuming that

profits are zero for every active firm in equilibrium when technologies
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display increasing returns to scale.

It is only true in exceptional cases

that imposition of the zero profit condition along with the standard
equilibrium conditions leads to an equilibrium with an integer number of
firms in these models.
In the second example, it is easily checked that entry by a third firm
is not profitable.

The addition of another Cournot oligopolist producing

either a new product or one of goods x or y leads to an equilibrium in
which at least one firm earns negative profit for both numeraire choices.

IV.

Alternative Objectives for the Firm

In a Walrasian equilibrium, price normalization does not effect
equilibrium relative prices and allocations.

The supply correspondence for

a profit-maximizing firm that takes relative prices as given does not
depend upon the numeraire choice.

There is no difference between

maximizing profit and maximizing the purchasing power of profit in terms of
any commodity bundle.

In Cournot-Walras

equilibria the objective for the

firm is to maximize profit in terms of the bundle of goods specified by the
price normalization.

When the firm recognizes its effect on prices, this

objective varies with the numeraire.
As Marshall (1922] pointed out, profit maximization may not be the
appropriate objective for imperfectly competitive firms, since owners care
about what their profit can buy so that there is a tradeoff between
monetary profit and the cost of the consumption bundle owners desire.

When

the firm can influence prices, it is natural to substitute utility
maximization for the owners for profit maximization.
Suppose that there is a single owner for each of the two firms in our
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examples.

Replacing profit maximization with utility maximization for this

single shareholder eliminates the dependence of the firm's optimal

production plan on price normalization under the assumption that the
shareholder behaves as a price-taker in her consumption decision.

Thus,

suppose that the owner of firm j has preferences satisfying standard
properties and that these yield the indirect utility function

p , w, w+Il. l .
J
n
(We assume that household j owns all of firm j and no shares in other firms

for simplicity only.)

Since this indirect utility is homogenous of degree

zero in prices, the optimal production plan is independent of the
numeraire.

However, the assumption that the owner as a consumer ignores

the influence she has on the market in her role as a producer is
implausible.

If this influence is recognized, then the problem is no

longer simple.3
Applications of the large group Chamberlinian monopolistic competition
model (for example, Krugman [1979, 1980, 1981], Helpman [1981]) assume that
p. has no direct effect on V .•
J
J

Under this assumption, utility maximization

for the owner implies that the firm should maximize her income expressed in
any price normalization.

It does not matter how prices are normalized.

this case, maximizing profit with leisure as the numeraire is the same as
maximizing indirect utility for household j.

However, maximizing the

profit of firm j for other choices of numeraire is not identical to
maximizing her income.

We do not need to worry about the profit

maximization assumption in the monopolistic competition models offered in
the international trade literature because they impose zero profits as an

equilibrium condition and assume that utility is broad-based in the sense
that the first-order effect of a rise in the price of any commodity on

In
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shareholder utilities is null.
Difficulties for modelling general equilibrium under imperfect
competition are not easily solved by the substitution of shareholder
utility for profit.

Dierker and Grodal [1986] show that a Cournot-Walras

equilibrium need not exist when there is a single shareholder with regular
preferences over consumption bundles in an example economy in which there
are two firms with strictly convex production sets.

If there are multiple

shareholders and they have different tastes, then the problem is how to
aggregate these preferences into an objective function for the firm.

V.

Conclusion

The difficulties encountered by theorists for extending general
equilibrium analysis to economies with monopolistic competition and
oligopoly have been ignored in the literature on international trade under
imperfect competition.

Under the large group assumptions made in the

applications of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of Chamberlinian monopolistic
competition to international trade, these problems do not arise.

When

these are relaxed the assumption of profit maximization becomes
problematic.

Utility maximization for the owners does not provide a

thoroughly adequate remedy.
Computable general equilibrium models of trade with imperfect
competition are especially vulnerable to the critique that the results can
be very sensitive to the arbitrary choice of price normalization.

Our

examples of how price normalization matters in a model representative of
those used in the trade literature with oligopoly imply that the effects of
policy changes on welfare and resource allocation are sensitive to the
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choice of num~raire in these models.

The computable general equilibrium

versions proposed by Harris [1984a,b], Cox and Harris (1985], Burniaux and
Waelbroeck [1992], de Melo and Roland-Holst (1990a,b) and Devarajan and
Rodrick [1989a,b) make a variety of assumptions about the nature of
imperfect competition.

These range from Chamberlinian monopolistic

competition for a large group of firms with free entry to the behavior
proposed by Eastman and Stykolt [1967] in which each imperfectly
competitive domestic firm sets its price equal to the tariff-inclusive
price of the competing import good.

All these models are subject to the

criticism that the estimated effects of trade reforms might depend on the
price normalization chosen by the authors.
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Footnotes
(1990] shows the possibility that elimination of a
consumption tax in a simple general equilibrium model with
oligopoly can lead to an increase in utility for a representative
household under one choice of numeraire and a decrease under
another. He uses an input-output model with Leontief technology
for two firms that violates the 'no free lunch' axiom, so that
the technologies are specified with exogenous bounds on outputs.
1 Ginsburgh

2Alternatively, Smith and Venables (1988, 1989] present
computable partial equilibrium industry models with imperfect
competition. These follow the spirit of oligopoly models in the
trade theory literature, such as Eaton and Grossman, in making an
implicit assumption about the numeraire and an explicit one about
firms not perceiving the income effect of their own profit on
demand.
3 This problem could be ignored by assuming that there are many
owners of each firm who have identical homothetic preferences.
In that case, it might be reasonable to assume that each owner
acts as a price-taker in her consumption decision while the firm
maximizes the representive owner's indirect utility function
taking account of its influence on relative prices.

